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INVESTIGATING THE MECHANISMS OF HOARDING
FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL PERSPECTIVE
Stephanie D. Preston, Ph.D.,1 Jordana R. Muroff, Ph.D.,2 and Steven M. Wengrovitz, M.A.3
Background: Acquiring and discarding objects are routine decision processes for
most people. Despite the ubiquitous need to make such decisions, little is known
about how they are made and what goes wrong when individuals acquire and
fail to discard so many items that many areas of their home become unlivable
(i.e., clinical hoarding). We hypothesize that clinical hoarding reflects a normal
variation in the tendency to acquire and retain objects, only just at a more
extreme level. Methods: To test this hypothesis, we examined 89 nonclinical,
undergraduate students’ performance on a novel experimental paradigm that
measures decisions about acquiring and discarding everyday objects. To test our
hypothesis, and validate our task as a possible research tool for studying
hoarding, we related decisions on the task to a variety of measures known to
correlate with clinical hoarding. The paradigm was sensitive to individual
differences, as subjects varied widely in the quantity of objects they chose to
acquire and retain under an increasing pressure to discard. In addition, we
replicated expected relationships from the clinical hoarding literature between
acquisition and retention tendencies and self-report measures of hoarding,
indecisiveness, and obsessive-compulsive behavior. Results: Our data suggest
that decisions about objects, even in a nonclinical undergraduate population,
vary widely and are influenced by the same variables that influence clinical
hoarding, but to a less extreme degree. Conclusions: Future research with this
experimental task can separately investigate the role of acquisition, retention,
impulsivity, and sensitivity to constraints in clinical hoarding to inform our
understanding of this disorder. Depression and Anxiety 26 : 425–437, 2009.
r 2009 Wiley-Liss, Inc.
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INTRODUCTION
Many times a day people must make resource-
allocation decisions, such as whether to acquire,
maintain, or discard objects to ensure a sufficient
supply for future needs without exceeding typical
constraints such as physical space, time, and money.
This is a complex decision process that seems to be
impaired in individuals with clinical ‘‘hoarding,’’ where
such individuals acquire and do not discard items, even
those that are ‘‘useless or of limited value,’’ until their
homes become so cluttered as to be partially or entirely
unlivable and even unsafe.[1] As a clinical disorder,
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hoarding has been difficult to diagnostically categorize
and challenging to treat both because of its complexity
and because of our limited understanding of the
cognitive processes and biological bases of normal
decisions to acquire and discard objects.
Problematic hoarding often results from traumatic
insult to the frontal cortex[2,3] and fMRI studies find
that hoarders have reduced activation in the dorsal
anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, compared to
control and nonhoarding obsessive-compulsive disor-
der (OCD) patients, respectively.[4] In nonclinical
populations, normal purchase decisions activate the
nucleus accumbens (NAc) in response to pictures of
desirable objects.[5] Taken together, the data suggest
that decisions about objects, and impairments therein,
may be subserved by the dopaminergic mesolimbocor-
tical system, including the ventral tegmentum, NAc,
anterior cingulate and frontal cortex.
In rodent species, these same areas are known to be
involved in adaptive food-storing behavior in animals,
also called ‘‘hoarding.’’ The NAc has been associated in
animals and humans with the anticipation and motiva-
tion toward rewarding stimuli such as drugs and
food.[6,7] When the NAc is lesioned in rats, animals
continue to consume food normally, and will carry food
from the feeding site to a secondary location to
consume it, but no longer carry food to a secondary
location for storage after they are sated—this impair-
ment is specific to hoarding and is not associated with a
reduction in food consumption, activity level, the
response to amphetamine, or damage to other fore-
brain structures; rather, it seems to be because of an
inability to be motivated by the rewarding properties of
food once the primary cues of motivation (e.g. smell,
feel) have been dampened by satiety.[8] The medial
frontal cortex, which is linked to the NAc through
bidirectional connections in the dopaminergic meso-
cortical circuit, is also thought to be involved in
producing behaviors toward food that are not depen-
dent on the primary features of the food or environ-
ment; when the medial frontal cortex is bilaterally
ablated in rats, the animals reduce hoarding, treat food
items as smaller than they are, and show an increased
sensitivity to primary environmental cues such as
illumination.[9] Parallel research on the mechanisms
of acquiring and retaining objects in nonclinical and
clinical populations could greatly advance our under-
standing of hoarding—a ubiquitous but poorly under-
stood process.
Evidence for a relationship between hoarding ten-
dencies and OCD has been repeatedly found using self-
report measures. Hoarding is commonly diagnosed as a
subtype of OCD,[10,11] although there are compelling
reasons to consider hoarding as distinct from non-
hoarding forms of OCD.[12] A hoarder may be
diagnosed with OCD in the absence of any additional
OCD symptoms, hoarding is associated with different
genetic markers than nonhoarding OCD,[13] and it is
resistant to traditional pharmacological treatment of
OCD[14–16] (but see Saxena[12]). Alternatively, beha-
vioral treatment of hoarding in OCD is often shown to
be efficacious;[17] Tolin and colleagues conducted an
open trial using cognitive behavioral therapy and
reported improved hoarding symptoms for half of
their 10 hoarding participants. Hoarding also occurs in
combination with many other conditions including
depression,[10,11,18] anorexia,[19] dementia,[20,21] schizo-
phrenia,[22] social phobia, and personality disorders.[23]
Additionally, the presence of compulsive buying[11,24,25]
and comorbid impulse control problems like tricho-
tillomania, skin picking, and kleptomania[23] have led
some to suggest that hoarding is an impulse-control
disorder or exists along a ‘‘compulsive-impulsive’’
spectrum [as defined by McElroy et al.[26]]. In sum,
although hoarding surely is contributed to by anxiety,
the situation is complex and further research is needed
to determine the etiology of hoarding.
We believe that one reason why hoarding is so poorly
understood is that we have very little knowledge on
decisions about acquiring and retaining objects in
general, whether unimpaired or impaired. By ap-
proaching the issue from a cognitive psychology
perspective, the present work aims to address this
insufficiency in the literature. To understand complex
behavior, cognitive psychology breaks processes down
into their component parts, assuming that impairments
result from a break in one of the subprocesses. Within
this framework, hoarding would result from a specific
impairment in either assessing the benefits of an object,
the likelihood of needing it later, the cost incurred by
retaining it, or the integration of these variables to
produce a decision. However, a cognitive model may
not be productive as an impairment in any one of these
subprocesses would ostensibly produce an impairment
in the others. For example, hoarders likely are impaired
at assessing the benefits of objects, as they perceive
objects as more useful or attach sentimental value to a
wider range of items than comparison subjects;[1,27,28]
this would also cause items to be perceived as more
necessary in the future, which would in turn minimize
the cost of retaining them. Unusually high regard for
objects could also explain the poor insight of hoarders,
because it would be only logical to keep and maintain
objects that are so clearly useful or sentimental.[15,29]
Although highly explanatory, a simple ‘‘overvaluation
of objects’’ model does not directly explain why
hoarding is related to anxiety, obsessions and compul-
sions, or trait indecisiveness.[30] We argue that it is
especially difficult to tease apart the contributing
factors to hoarding because we do not understand
how people normally make decisions about acquiring
and retaining objects.
Even in nonclinical populations, there are substantial
deviations in the quantity and quality of objects that
people choose to acquire and maintain. For example,
some individuals prefer a ‘‘homey’’ aesthetic, full of
knick-knacks and memorabilia, whereas others prefer a
more Spartan environment, full of ‘‘clean lines’’ and
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absent of clutter. We hypothesize that hoarding is an
extreme version of the more ‘‘homey’’ phenotype,
drawn from the same distribution but much farther
out on the tails, to the point where disorganized piles
of clutter can travel as high as the ceiling. As such, the
same psychological processes that produce normal
variation in object acquisition and retention produce
clinical hoarding at the extremes.
As evidence for a link between nonclincial and
clinical decisions about acquiring and retaining objects,
research in nonclinical populations has found similar
relationships between nonclinical hoarding tendencies
and clinical hoarding symptoms.[28,29] For example,
Frost et al. found that individuals with increased
hoarding tendencies also exhibit increased cognitive-
behavioral problems including social anxiety, anxiety
sensitivity, depressive symptoms,[31] obsessive compul-
siveness,[31,32] perfectionism,[27] and indecisiveness.[30]
One limitation of these studies is that they tend to
rely solely on self-report measures of hoarding
tendencies, psychopathology and personality. Self-
report measures may be less sensitive than behavioral
measures because they are affected by biases such as
social desirability and limited by the ability of subjects
to understand their own behavior and motivations;[33]
this is especially problematic for a disorder like
hoarding, which is characterized by poor insight.
Moreover, to understand decisions about resources in
general, it would be useful to have a behavioral task
that can be manipulated and tested in a variety of
circumstances, including functional neuroimaging, to
test specific hypotheses about the cognitive and neural
processes involved. More systematic testing of the
reasons why people acquire and retain objects, and why
some people do so to an excessive degree, can elucidate
clinical hoarding as well as normative decisions about
the acquisition and retention of objects.
Toward that end, we used a novel experimental
paradigm that separately assessed subjects’ understand-
ing of the value of objects, their tendency to acquire
various types of free, everyday objects, and their ability
to discard acquired items under increasing pressure to
conform to space limitations. To determine if
increased acquisition and retention in this nonclinical
population was driven by similar factors as clinical-
level hoarding, we also correlated behavior on
the task with self-report measures of anxiety,
depression, obsessions and compulsions, hoarding
(acquisition and discarding), indecisiveness, and
procrastination. We expected subjects to differ on both
the quantity and quality of objects selected, and for
how long they would retain the items under pressure to
discard. Subjects who took more items were expected
to respond faster to acquisition trials and slower to
discard trials whereas those who took few items would
show the reverse pattern. Subjects who took more
items, in keeping with the clinical literature, were also
expected to rate items as more useful and exhibit higher
(but not necessarily clinical-level) scores on the




Subjects were presented with a computerized experimental task
using pictures of everyday objects that one might find in a home,
ranging from objects of no clear value or usefulness (broken egg
shells) to very valuable (diamond ring) or very useful (new legal pads)
objects. First, the subjects were instructed to acquire any of 107 items
that they would (hypothetically) want to take home for free, to
measure the tendency to acquire things. This was followed by
multiple rounds of discarding the acquired objects, with increasing
pressure, to determine how sensitive subjects were to constraints. We
used the decisions about objects to mathematically create three
clusters of decision makers, based on the quantity and quality of
objects that the subjects took. To further validate the experimental
task, we used these subject clusters to investigate relationships
between the quantity of objects and self-report measures of
psychopathology and trait decision making known to be associated
with hoarding.
PARTICIPANTS
This study was performed in the University of Michigan
Department of Psychology. The participants were 89 undergraduate
students (46 males, 43 females; age range: 17–24) enrolled in
introductory psychology at the University of Michigan who received
course credit in exchange for their voluntary participation.
GENERAL OVERVIEW
The study was administered in a PC computer lab with subjects
seated at every other computer. After being seated, the subjects read
and signed an informed consent document and then completed all
elements of the experiment on the computer in a single session lasting
approximately 90 min.
There were four main components of the study. The first two, the
Object Estimate Task and the Object Decision Task (both described
in more detail below), were computerized tasks administered using E-
Prime Version 1.1 (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Pittsburg, PA);
the order of these two tasks was counterbalanced across subjects (half
did Estimation first, half Decision first). After completing these two
tasks, the subjects completed a series of personality and psycho-
pathology scales (described below and in Table 1). After all the
elements were completed, the subjects were debriefed, and remained
in their seats until the end of the session.
STIMULI
Each task used color, digital pictures of real objects taken by a
professional photographer against a white background. The pictures
were created such that each object occupied approximately the same
proportion of the picture and, thus, were not to scale. Bitmap images
were presented on a computer screen at 10 10 centimeters square
(original image size: 615 461, DPI: 96). A pool of 214 pictures was
divided into two batches, referred to hereafter as A and B, so that
estimations of the objects would not influence decisions about the
objects and vice versa. Thus, half of the subjects estimated batch A
and made decisions about batch B, whereas the other half estimated
batch B and made decisions about batch A. Pilot data were used to
create roughly similar distributions of the types of objects in the two
batches based on the value, usefulness, and tendency to be saved.
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Within each block, the pictures were always presented in randomized
order.
OBJECT ESTIMATE TASK
The Object Estimate Task was comprised of two blocks, order
counterbalanced. For the price estimates, subjects viewed each object
in their assigned batch (A or B), one at a time, in randomized order,
and estimated the price of the object in dollars, using whole numbers
($0, $1, $2, $3y). For the usefulness estimates, the subjects viewed
each object in the same batch, again in random order, and judged how
useful the item was on a scale from 1 (‘‘not useful at all’’) to 7
(‘‘extremely useful’’).
OBJECT DECISION TASK
The Object Decision Task is comprised of three parts: exposure to
items, personal object decisions, and other’s object decisions, in that
order. The task was preceded by a practice version that was identical
to the test version of the task, but only containing seven pictures. In
this way, individuals were exposed to the entire structure of the task
and were given a chance to ask questions so that they would
understand all phases of the task before starting data collection.
To give each subject sufficient time to decide in the test blocks,
but still provide time pressure to decide, each subject was given a
variable amount of time to decide per picture in the personal and
other object decision parts that was based on how long they took, on
average, to make decisions in the practice version. We call this the
adaptive-timing algorithm, which we calculated using the following
formula:
Ttest ¼Mpractice þ SDpractice þ Z:
In this formula, T is a variable stimulus presentation time for the test
trials that differs as a function of each subject’s mean time to respond
to each stimulus in the practice version (M), plus their standard
deviation for this measure (SD), plus an additional, randomly selected
amount of time (Z) added to each trial (between 500 and 500 ms) to
prevent stereotyped responding.
In the exposure block, subjects viewed all 107 pictures from their
assigned batch (A or B; the batch not used in their Object Estimate
Task), one at a time, for as long as they wanted to by holding down
the spacebar on the keyboard. This allowed the subjects time to view
each item freely so that in the subsequent decision blocks the
decisions would not be contaminated by confusion about the identity
of the object.
The personal object acquisition/retention decision part of the
experiment consisted of four blocks of trials: the acquisition block,
free discard block, low-pressure discard block, and high-pressure
discard block (in that order) in which the subjects were explicitly
instructed to ‘‘imagine that we have all of these items in the lab, and
you can take home whichever ones you want to for free.’’ (No objects
were actually transferred.) In the acquisition block, the participants
again viewed all 107 pictures in randomized order with a presentation
time based on the adaptive-timing algorithm and were asked to press
any key if they wanted to keep the item. If they depressed a key before
the picture disappeared, a green border appeared around the picture,
indicating that they successfully took it. The picture remained up for
the duration of the calculated time, at which point, a screen came up
asking subjects to press a key to go to the next trial, allowing subjects
to rest between pictures if necessary. Following the acquisition phase,
the subjects performed a series of discard phases where they were
presented with all of the items they chose to acquire in the previous
block, in randomized order. First, there was a free discard phase,
where they were simply told that they could remove any items that
they had previously taken, for example, if they changed their mind or
took something by accident. Next, there was a low-pressure block
where they ‘‘could only keep as many items as would fit in a shopping
cart’’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘‘cart’’ block). Next, there was a
high-pressure block where they ‘‘could only keep as many items as
would fit in a paper bag’’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘‘bag’’ block; the
bag shown was a standard, grocery-store-sized paper bag). It should
be noted that these space parameters were not enforced in any way
and subjects could keep more items than would actually fit into the
allotted space.
Personal discard tendencies are constrained by how many items a
subject acquired, creating difficulties in analyzing the discard
tendencies because of the great variation in the number of items
that could be discarded (i.e., floor effects and heterogeneities in
variance). Therefore, an additional block was appended as a pure
measure of discard tendencies irrespective of acquisition tendencies.
The other’s object decision block of the experiment consisted of a
single block of 60 pictures from the A and B batch, shown one at a
time, in randomized order, in which subjects were explicitly told
‘‘these were items that another subject had chosen and you should
discard any of their items that you do not want.’’
QUESTIONNAIRES
Following the computerized tasks, the participants completed a
battery of standard scales measuring psychopathology, hoarding, and
trait decision making (Table 1). There were two psychopathology
scales. The Beck Depression Inventory II[39] consists of one total
score and was administered because hoarding is known to be affected
by depression.[10] The Beck Depression Inventory has good internal
consistency and reasonable construct validity.[38] The Obsessive-
Compulsive Inventory-Revised is an instrument that was designed to
measure obsessions and compulsions on six separate dimensions—
washing, obsessing, ordering, checking, neutralizing, and hoard-
ing.[37] The subscales show high internal consistency, moderate to
high test–retest reliability, and good convergent validity with other
OCD measures. It differentiates well between people with OCD and
nonanxious controls.[37] OCD symptoms needed to be assessed
because hoarding is currently diagnosed as a form of OCD; this
particular instrument was selected because it has been used previously
with a nonclinical population and it includes three specific items on
hoarding (‘‘I have saved up so many things that they get in the way,’’
‘‘I collect things I don’t need,’’ and ‘‘I avoid throwing things away
because I am afraid I might need them later’’). The State-Trait
Anxiety Inventory [STAI-Trait version],[40] consisting of one total
score, was administered because hoarding is classified as an anxiety
disorder. Because this instrument was designed to assess anxiety in
nonclinical populations, it may detect anxiety in our sample that a
clinical instrument may not. The STAI has good to excellent internal
consistency (a between .86 and .95), good test–retest reliability (r .76
to .86), and good convergent validity. There were two hoarding-
related scales that were selected because they have been previously
validated for detecting differences in hoarding tendencies in both
nonclinical and clinical populations. The Saving Inventory-Revised is
a scale designed to measure hoarding tendencies, with separate
subscales for acquisition, discard, clutter, and a total score.[36] The
three subscales have been shown to have good internal consistency
and test–retest reliability.[36] The Saving Cognitions Inventory-
Revised is a scale designed to look at people’s reasons for keeping
items including subscales for emotional attachment, memory,
control, and responsibility.[41] These subscales showed good internal
consistency and convergent and discriminant validity.[41] Hoarding is
known to be influenced by indecisiveness; thus, we used three
separate scales that measure the ability to make decisions quickly
versus slowly. The Frost Indecisiveness Scale has previously been
used to study hoarding, consisting of one total score.[30] It has been
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shown to have high internal reliability and is correlated to other
hoarding, procrastination, perfectionism, decision making, and
compulsivity measures.[30] The Decisional Procrastination Scale is a
short instrument that consists of one total score that measures the
tendency to put off decisions.[34] It is reliable and valid with a
Cronbach a of .80 and 1-month test-retest reliability of .69 [Mann,
personal communication, January 5, 1988[42]]. The Melbourne
Decision Making Questionnaire is a longer instrument with separate
subscales for multiple decision making elements including vigilance,
hypervigilance, buck-passing, and procrastination with good psycho-
metric properties. These scales show good reliability with vigilance
(a5 0.80), hypervigilance (a5 .74), buck-passing (a5 0.87), and
procrastination (a5 0.81).[35]
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
For ease of presentation and clarity, given the
complexity of the analyses, we present the results
together with their aforementioned analysis technique,
grouped according to the construct of interest. Because
half of the subjects viewed batch A pictures and the
other half batch B pictures, analyses were first
presented separately for the two groups, to determine
through descriptive statistics and general analysis of the
object decisions if the two groups were really compar-
able. Then, multidimensional cluster analyses were
performed on both groups separately to isolate
different types of subjects, resulting in three clusters
in each group. Follow-up analyses were performed to
determine what differed among the three clusters, and
to ensure that the clusters could be combined across
the A and B batches. Finally, hypothesis-driven tests
were done to determine if the three types of subject
clusters differed in their impulsivity, depression, OCD
symptoms, anxiety, hoarding, or the ability to make
decisions. All the analyses were performed using SPSS
(SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL), version 11.0.4 for Macintosh.
The a level was set at .05 for all comparisons.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
On average, subjects viewed each picture for a mean
of 946.57 ms (SD 5 346.94 ms). In the personal object
decision part of the task, out of 107 total items, people
acquired on average 34.49 items (SD 5 17.83, range:
0–82), discarded 5.52 of these in the free-discard block
(SD 5 4.61, range: 0–21), 4.42 more in the cart block
(SD 5 5.62; range: 0–30), and 8.98 more in the bag
block (SD 5 7.94; range: 0–36), for an average sum of
15.58 items retained in the paper bag (SD 5 7.73 range:
0–46). In the other’s object decision part of the task, out
of the 60 total items, people discarded on average 30.21
of the other person’s items (SD 5 11.14; range: 0–52)
for a total of 29.79 items remaining at the end of the
block (SD 5 11.14; range: 8–60).
Repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was used to determine if changes in the number of
items kept across the four personal decision blocks (i.e.,
acquisition, free discard, cart, bag) differed by block,
demonstrating that subjects were taking the discard
blocks and their space constraints seriously; sex and
age were included as independent variables because
hoarding is known to be more common in females
and with older participants. The number of items
kept by subjects did differ significantly by block,
(F(3,186) 5 63.646, Po.001) both for batches A (main
effect: F(1,124) 5 542.696, Po.001) and B (main effect:
F(1,130) 5 253.617, Po.001), due to an overall de-
crease in the number of items kept as the blocks
progressed in both the batches (A: 13.59, t 523.30,
Po.001; B: 9.60, t 516.44, Po.001); this demon-
strates that, overall, subjects responded adaptively to
the increasing space constraints. The number of objects
in each block did not differ by age (F(7,89) 5 0.923, ns)
or sex (F(1,76) 5 1.549, ns), and there was no interac-
tion (F(4,76) 5 1.528, ns).
SUBJECT CLUSTERS
Statistical determination of the three clusters. -
Behavior on the Object Decision Task varied widely
across subjects, but pilot data suggest at least three
common strategies: taking many items and discarding
very few, taking very few items and not discarding, and
taking many items but also discarding a lot under
pressure. To search for these expected commonalities
among subjects, hierarchical cluster analyses were
performed using the Ward method[43] on the number
of blocks each item was kept (0–4) in the personal
object decision part of the experiment. The Ward
method for cluster analysis starts with each individual
as its own cluster, and then computes the geometric
distance between subjects in multidimensional space.
Clusters are progressively merged to create larger and
larger clusters by minimizing the Sum of Squares based
on the distance between subjects, until three groups are
formed (a stable and significant number of groups that
we prespecified based on pilot data).
As an input to the cluster analysis, we created a new
variable that encapsulated three different aspects of the
subjects’ performance into a single variable—the
‘‘duration’’ data. The duration variable represented
the number of blocks that each subject kept each
object, from 0 (never taken) to 4 (kept through the
high-pressure block). Importantly then, the statistical
grouping of subjects was based on a combination
of the number and identity of items acquired and how
long each was retained across the blocks. This multi-
dimensional variable is more powerful than looking at a
single variable (such as the number acquired), which
may not effectively represent the underlying construct
of interest.
Because the duration data included object identity
information and the A and B batches consisted of
different objects, cluster analyses were initially done
separately for the A and B groups. We selectively
looked for three-cluster solutions in each group and
found that solution to be statistically significant in both
the groups.
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Follow-up analyses to interpret the three clus-
ters. Cluster analysis is agnostic with respect to the
interpretation of the clusters and ‘‘duration’’ is a
multidimensional variable. Therefore, follow-up ana-
lyses were required to determine what exactly differed
among the subject clusters. Specifically, we planned to
look at the amount acquired and the rate of discard to
determine what caused the subjects to be grouped this
way and if the grouping was the same for the two
batches of subjects (A and B).
For each of the follow-up dependent measures
(number of personal items acquired and discarded
and number of other’s objects discarded), we modeled
differences among the three subject clusters using a
general linear model, run separately for batches A and
B. Subject identity was modeled as a random factor
(using the iterative restricted maximum likelihood
methods), subject cluster as a nominal factor, block
number as a continuous factor (four levels), and the
cluster-by-block interaction was included to look for
significant effects in the contrasts of block, cluster, and
a block-by-cluster interaction. Scaled estimates were
used to further investigate significant interactions.
If the results from these general linear models are the
same in the A and B batches, then the subjects who
viewed batch A and those who viewed batch B pictures
can be combined into one larger set of three clusters
and these larger groups can be investigated to test
specific hypotheses. For example, we could determine
from the data collected in the task if the subjects who
kept more objects were more impulsive (took things
faster), estimated objects as being worth more money
or more useful, or had higher rates of self-reported
depression, anxiety, hoarding, indecisiveness, and
procrastination.
Acquisition decisions. A main effect of the
number of items taken per cluster was observed in
batches A (F(2,12) 5 72.434, Po.001) and B
(F(2,127) 5 58.275, Po.001) (Fig. 1a and b). In each
batch, significantly more objects than average were
taken by one group, hereafter the ‘‘Acquiring cluster’’
(A: 17.62, t 5 9.38, Po.001; B: 16.42, t 5 9.64,
Po.001), significantly fewer objects than average were
taken by another group, hereafter the ‘‘Spartan cluster’’
(A: 15.82, t 511.66, Po.001; B: 13.27, t 59.7,
Po.001), and a third group was intermediate, hereafter
the ‘‘Intermediate cluster.’’ Fewer objects than average
were taken by the Intermediate cluster in batch B only
(A: 1.80, t 51.18, ns; B: 3.15, t 52.25, Po.05).
Discard decisions. The block-by-cluster interac-
tion was significant in batch A (F(2,124) 5 66.261,
Po.001) and batch B (F(2,127) 5 18.988, Po.001), due
to the fact that significantly more items than average
were discarded per block by the Acquiring cluster (A:
8.53, t 58.82, Po.001; B: 5.65, t 55.86,
Po.001), significantly fewer objects than average were
discarded per block by the Spartan cluster (A: 7.84,
t 5 11.21, Po.001; B: 3.92, t 5 5.06, Po.001), and
Figure 1. (a and b) average number of items selected (7standard error) for batches A and B, respectively, by block and subject cluster.
Diamonds represent Acquiring cluster, squares represent Intermediate cluster, and triangles represent Spartan cluster. Asterisks denote
significant differences (Po.001).
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significantly fewer objects than average were discarded
per block by the Intermediate cluster in batch B (A:
0.69, ns.; B: 1.52, t 5 1.73 Po.05). Note, these effects
are due to the fact that the Acquiring cluster started
with many more items, requiring that many more be
discarded to comply with the decreasing space; these
effects remain even when analyses are done using the
percentage of items held, rather than the raw number
(F43.62, |t|42.28, Po0.05).
Other’s object decisions. Univariate ANOVA was
used to compare the number of items discarded in the
other’s object decision block for each of the subject
clusters, again separately for batches A and B.
There were no significant differences between
subject clusters for the number of items discarded
during the other’s object decision part of the task
for batch A (F(2,40) 5 1.647, ns) or batch B
(F(2,43) 5 2.452, ns).
THE ACQUIRING, INTERMEDIATE, AND
SPARTAN CLUSTERS
In the previous analyses, we determined that there
were some systematic differences between the three
subject clusters that were mirrored in the two pictures
batches, A and B. That is, in both the A and the B
groups, there were three clusters of subjects with the
following properties: (1) one cluster of subjects took
many more things and subsequently had to discard
many more things to try to meet the increasing space
constraints (hereafter the Acquiring cluster), (2) one
group took very few things and therefore did not have
to remove items to meet the increasing space con-
straints (hereafter the Spartan cluster), and (3) one
group shared properties of both the Acquiring and
Spartan cluster, taking more items initially, but then
discarding more items to meet the constraints, so that
they took many fewer items total and were more
successful (than the Acquiring cluster) in meeting the
space constraints (hereafter, the Intermediate cluster).
For increased statistical power with our subsequent
analyses, we combined the respective clusters from A
and B into three larger clusters and used them to
investigate hypothesized contributors to acquiring and
retaining items (gender, impulse control problems,
overvaluation of price or usefulness, hoarding tenden-
cies, depression, anxiety, obsessions and compulsions,
and decision impairment).
Gender frequencies by subject cluster. Because
of the fact that clinical hoarding studies find a greater
proportion of female hoarders than male, w2 was used
to determine if there were more females in our
Acquiring cluster. There were no significant differ-
ences in the number of males and females across the
three clusters in the three combined subject clusters
(w2(2, N 5 89) 5 4.147, P 5.126); although nonsignifi-
cant, there were about twice as many females as
compared to males in the Acquiring cluster in batch
A, batch B, and the combined group (Table 2).
Impulse control by subject cluster. To investi-
gate possible differences in impulse control across the
three clusters, we compared mean response times
across the four personal response blocks using
repeated-measures ANOVA for the combined subject
clusters. Note that only objects acquired in the
acquisition block and discarded in the discard blocks
yielded response time data as nonselected items simply
disappeared after the duration determined by the
adaptive-timing algorithm.
Response times to the acquired and discarded objects
differed significantly by block (main effect: F(3,
54) 5 25.373, Po.001; Fig. 2) owing to shorter
response times in the acquire and bag blocks than in
the free discard and cart blocks (t(59) 473.47,
Po.001). These response times by block also differed
as a function of the three combined subject clusters
(interaction: F(6, 110) 5 2.240, P 5.045), because the
Acquiring cluster responded especially quickly in the
acquire block (M 5 795.620 ms) whereas the Spartan
cluster responded especially slowly in the cart block
(M 5 1252.256 ms) compared to the global mean
(M 5 1040.633 ms); however, these pairwise differences
were not significant after correcting for multiple
comparisons using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Dif-
ferences (HSD) post hoc test (P4.162).
Estimates of value by subject cluster. To in-
vestigate possible differences in the perceived value of
objects across the three combined subject clusters,
multivariate ANOVA was used to determine if the
mean Z-scores for estimates of price and usefulness in
the Object Estimate Task differed across the combined
subject clusters.
There were no significant differences among the
three combined subject clusters in their relative
estimations of price (F(2, 86) 5 .638, P 5.531) or
usefulness (F(2, 86) 5 2.100, P 5.129), although useful-
ness indicated a trend with the Acquiring cluster having
higher positive Z-scores for usefulness compared to the
TABLE 2. Frequencies of individuals in each of the
three clusters (the Spartan cluster, Intermediate cluster,
and Acquiring cluster) broken down by gender within
each picture batch (A and B) and for the three combined
subject clusters
Cluster
Picture batch Gender Acquiring Intermediate Spartan
A Female 5 6 11
Male 1 7 13
Total 6 13 24
B Female 5 6 10
Male 3 12 10
Total 8 18 20
A and B combined Female 10 12 21
Male 4 19 23
Total 14 31 44
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Intermediate and Spartan cluster (respectively:
M 5 0.210, 0.015, 0.077).
Differences in self-report measures by subject
cluster. Multivariate ANOVA was used to determine
if there were significant omnibus relationships among
the combined subject clusters and their scores on each
of the self-report questionnaires. Tukey’s HSD post
hoc tests were used to determine which of the clusters
were significantly different from the others on each
scale.
Results from multivariate ANOVA (Table 3) indicate
significant differences among the three combined
subject clusters for Savings Inventory-Revised Total,
Savings Inventory-Revised Discard, Savings Inventory-
Revised Acquisition, Indecisiveness Scale, Melbourne
Decision Making Questionnaire Total, Obsessive
Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R) Total, and
OCI-R Checking. Interestingly, on all of these scales
the Acquiring cluster scored the highest, meaning that
they had more trouble discarding items and more
obsessions and compulsions overall, especially related
to checking (see Table 3 for detailed pairwise informa-
tion). The OCI-R Hoarding subscale showed a trend
for a difference among the three combined subject
clusters (F(2,82) 5 2.828, P 5.065) due to higher mean
scores for the Acquiring cluster. No other differences
were significant.
DISCUSSION
A novel experimental paradigm with behavioral
dependent measures was used to investigate differences
in acquisition and discard behavior among individuals
in a nonclinical, undergraduate population. The para-
digm proved to be sensitive to individual differences, as
it produced significant variations in behavior both for
acquisition and discard tendencies, despite the fact that
all decisions were explicitly hypothetical (no objects
were actually exchanged), and an exclusively nonclini-
cal population was interviewed.
Our population was decidedly homogeneous, with all
subjects being approximately at the same age and level
of education (and likely other sociodemographics);
therefore, although our results may not fully generalize
to the general population, the fact that our task found
variability in this restricted population is a testament to
its sensitivity. Moreover, the fact that we found several
standard relationships between the behavior on our
task and self-report measures of hoarding, psycho-
pathology, and trait decision making suggests both that
nonclinical increases in acquisition and retention may
mirror the more extreme increases found in clinical
hoarding and that our task is likely to be sensitive to
real-world problems making decisions about objects.
Based on the behavior of subjects on the task, we
used multidimensional cluster analysis to statistically
group subjects into three types, the Acquiring cluster
(those who selected and retained the most items), the
Spartan cluster (those who selected and retained the
fewest items), and the Intermediate cluster (those who
selected an intermediate number of items, but also
discarded many); these three clusters were then used as
an independent variable with three levels to investigate
the relationship between acquisition and retention
decisions, psychopathology, and trait decision making.
The Acquiring cluster took between 42 and 82 of the
107 objects in the initial acquisition block, whereas the
Spartan cluster took between 0 and 41, creating
completely nonoverlapping distributions in the quan-
tity of objects taken by these groups. These differences
Figure 2. Average response time in milliseconds (7standard error) by block and subject cluster. Unfilled bars represent Spartan cluster,
hatched bars represent Intermediate cluster, and filled bars represent Acquiring cluster. The asterisk denotes a significant main effect of
block and a block-by-cluster interaction (Po.05).
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in acquisition are interesting and are not necessitated
by the fact that we isolated three subject groups.
The three subject groups were statistically derived
based on a multidimensional variable (‘‘duration’’) that
included information about decisions across all four
blocks as well as the identity of the objects. As such,
subject clusters could have been based on any
combination of information about acquisition, rate
of discard, or the types of items that were selected
or discarded. There was no a priori reason to expect
subjects to differ in the acquisition block alone;
subjects in the three groups could have simply selected
different objects or kept them for longer after having
acquired the same amount. Thus, even in our
nonclinical sample, the task was able to produce an
effective scale and distribution of initial responses to
the objects.
The trend for higher usefulness estimates by the
Acquiring cluster suggests that they may perceive more
objects as useful than their peers; further research with
a larger sample can verify this effect and determine if it
is due to a greater sense of creativity, flexibility, or
vision on the part of the Acquiring cluster,[44] or simply
a lower threshold for what they would consider a
realistic use. In contrast, it is unlikely that the
Acquiring cluster is impaired at detecting the monetary
value of objects; three separate experiments (Preston,
unpublished) have not found a relationship between the
estimated price of objects and object decisions. This is
of theoretical importance because it indicates that
decisions about objects in the lab, by and large, are
based more on the subjective, perceived value and
usefulness of objects to the individual than to monetary
concerns, the latter of which is emphasized by
traditional economic models of decision making. It is
possible that something about the hypothetical nature
of our task does not allow us to access an existing
monetary overvaluation of objects; however, we believe
that this hypothesis is unlikely. All other comparisons
produced intersubject variability and expected relation-
ships with other measures, demonstrating that the
hypothetical nature of the task was not a problem; we
do not see any theoretical reason why estimations of
price would differ in this regard.
The Acquiring cluster not only wanted the greatest
quantity of items, but they also did so with the fastest
TABLE 3. Results from the multivariate ANOVA looking at the relationship between the three subject clusters
(subjects combined from batches A and B) and their respective scores on the self-report scales (Po.05, tPo.10)
Cluster
Scale measure F(2,82) P Acquiring Intermediate Spartan
SI-R Total 3.241 0.044 31.79 (3.53)a 21.61 (2.37)b 22.29 (2.04)a,b
SI-R Clutter 1.125 0.330 8.86 (1.51) 6.32 (1.01)a 6.45 (0.87)
SI-R Discard 3.597 0.032 12.07 (1.47)a 7.81 (0.98)b 7.76 (0.85)b
SI-R Acquisition 3.501 0.035 10.86 (1.08)a 7.48 (0.73)b 8.07 (0.62)a,b
BDI Total 0.747 0.477 11.50 (2.33) 8.71 (1.56) 10.90 (1.34)
BDI Depression 0.352 0.705 0.43 (0.21) 0.32 (0.14) 0.48 (0.12)
FIS 3.404 0.038 45.79 (2.39)a 38.32 (1.60)b 41.17 (1.38)a,b
MDM total 4.294 0.017 25.29 (1.60)a 19.87 (1.07)b 20.50 (0.92)b
MDM Vigilance 1.229 0.298 10.00 (0.61) 9.19 (0.41) 8.90 (0.35)
MDM Buck-passing 2.581 0.082t 6.14 (0.69) 4.26 (0.46) 4.95 (0.40)
MDM Procrastination 2.346 0.102 4.36 (0.56) 2.90 (0.37) 3.33 (0.32)
MDM Hypervigilance 2.553 0.084t 4.79 (0.57) 3.52 (0.38) 3.31 (0.33)
DPS 2.530 0.086t 14.93 (1.06) 12.26 (0.71) 12.38 (0.61)
STAI-T 0.772 0.466 43.21 (2.63) 39.74 (1.76) 39.60 (1.52)
SCI-R-Total 0.973 0.382 74.14 (6.51) 64.06 (4.38) 70.05 (3.76)
SCI-R Emotional Attachment 0.652 0.524 27.93 (3.05) 25.03 (2.05) 27.95 (1.76)
SCI-R Memory 1.388 0.255 15.21 (1.64) 12.03 (1.10) 13.57 (0.95)
SCI-R Control 0.163 0.850 11.14 (1.11) 11.90 (0.74) 11.67 (0.64)
SCI-R Responsibility 2.311 0.106 19.86 (1.85) 15.10 (1.24) 16.86 (1.07)
OCI-R-Total 3.454 0.036 20.29 (2.94)a 16.13 (1.97)a,b 11.88 (1.70)b
OCI-R Washing 0.844 0.434 2.14 (0.56) 1.39 (0.37) 1.33 (0.32)
OCI-R Obsessing 2.113 0.127 3.29 (0.62) 2.90 (0.42) 2.02 (0.36)
OCI-R Hoarding 2.828 0.065t 5.07 (0.72) 3.39 (0.48) 3.12 (0.42)
OCI-R Ordering 3.060 0.052t 3.57 (0.75) 4.00 (0.50) 2.40 (0.43)
OCI-R Checking 3.348 0.04 3.43 (0.57)a 2.48 (0.38)a,b 1.79 (0.33)b
OCI-R Neutralizing 3.022 0.054t 2.79 (0.58) 1.97 (0.39) 1.21 (0.34)
Values under each cluster represent means (SE) and letters indicate differences among clusters in Tukey post hoc tests of significance (Po.05).
ANOVA, analysis of variance; SI-R, Savings Inventory-Revised; BDI, Beck Depression Inventory; FIS, Indecisiveness Scale; MDM, Melbourne
Decision Making Questionnaire; DPS, Decisional Procrastination Scale; STAI-T, State Trait Anxiety Inventory-Trait; SCI-R, Savings Cognitions
Inventory-Revised; OCI-R, Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised.
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response times in the whole experiment—significantly
less than a second, which was faster than the Spartan or
Intermediate clusters at any stage. These data support a
hypothesized link between hoarding and either com-
pulsiveness or impulsivity.[11,25] However, because the
Acquiring cluster responded quickly to acquisition
decisions and the Spartan cluster to discard decisions,
these effects cannot be due to any generalized
personality or motor differences among the Acquiring
and Spartan clusters, such as higher enthusiasm, faster
decision making, or a compulsive tendency to push
buttons. Rather, these differences reveal expected
differences in the way that decisions are processed
depending on the frame (to acquire an object, or get rid
of it). It is also possible that the Acquiring cluster
responded quickly to acquisition decisions not because
they are impulsive, but simply because they perceived
the items as more clearly desirable or useful, and thus
were motivated to acquire the objects and were able to
respond quickly to a more straightforward choice.
Further research is needed to determine the source of
these differences in response time.
The Acquiring cluster did discard significantly more
objects than the other groups (demonstrating that they
were somewhat sensitive to constraints), but overall
their compliance was minimal, with 16–46 items in the
paper bag, overlapping little with the other two groups
who kept between 1 and 26 items. Thus, statistically
significant differences in the discard behavior of the
Acquiring cluster are mostly attributable to the fact
that they simply had more items to dispose of and not
to their exceptional ability to discard. One could argue
that the incomplete response of the Acquiring cluster
to comply with the constraints was owing to the fact
that they were not enforced. Debriefing of the subjects,
however, revealed a belief in the Acquiring cluster that
the constraints did not pose a logistical problem
because they could always stack objects high above
the rim, use a backpack they acquired to hold some of
the objects, or place some objects in the building
temporarily until they could get them home [akin to
temporary caching near an ephemeral patch of food in
nonhuman animals].[45] While again these responses
reflect a logical and creative solution to a problem if
taken at the level of the individual decision, hoarding is
considered a clinical disorder because such individual
decisions, which are always biased toward retention,
‘‘stack up,’’ producing long-term situations that have
severe negative consequences.
In contrast to the inference that the Acquiring cluster
has a general impairment in discarding objects, there
were no differences among the three clusters when
discarding objects that belonged to someone else (i.e.,
the other’s object decision block). This may suggest
that the Acquiring cluster really does have a specific
problem with acquisition,[24] with controlling im-
pulses,[11,25] and/or a specific fear of losing an item
classified as their own, the latter of which is consistent
with the hoarders’ increased sentimentality for and
emotional comfort from objects.[28] An impairment
that is specific to the Acquiring cluster’s own objects is
also consistent with recent research demonstrating a
specific categorization impairment for hoarders when
dealing with personal items.[46] Note that the tendency
to deem objects as personal would have to occur at a
very superficial level as the objects ‘‘acquired’’ in this
task were only hypothetical and were never held by the
subjects as they are in traditional tests of the Endow-
ment Effect where the subjects increase their valuation
of an object, such as a mug, after it is given to
them.[47,48]
Demonstrating the validity of the experimental task,
performance on the task correlated with scale measures
of psychopathology and trait decision making, which
have been previously shown to be related to hoarding
in nonclinical populations[31]. The Acquiring cluster
had higher scores overall, and on the Acquire and
Discard subscales, on the Saving Inventory-Revised—a
scale which has been previously shown to relate to real-
world hoarding impairment.[27,36] The Acquiring
cluster also had higher scores on the Indecisiveness
Scale, another measure previously shown to relate to
hoarding[27,30,41], and on the more general Melbourne
Decision Making Questionnaire, further confirming
that hoarders have a decision impairment that extends
beyond decisions about objects.
The Acquiring cluster also demonstrated more
obsessions and compulsions, reflected in higher
total scores on the OCI-R, more checking behavior,
as well as trends for more hoarding and neutralizing.
Although the OCI-R Hoarding subscale was expected
to be the most relevant, checking has also been
related to hoarding in earlier research.[30] This further
demonstrates the validity of our task and verifies
that nonclinical decisions about acquiring and
retaining objects are affected by similar underlying
constructs. The fact that we observed relationships on
these scales designed to test clinical-level problems
attests to the strength of the effects and the continuous
nature of the phenomenon. Relationships between
performance on the task and self-report measures of
obsessions and compulsions also lend credence to the
view of clinical hoarding as a spectrum disorder of
OCD,[26] and a disorder that is emotional as well as
cognitive.
Using a traditional decision-making model where
costs and benefits, integrated to produce a decision,
may not be particularly generative for the study of
hoarding because clinical and nonclinical individuals
with hoarding tendencies seem to be impaired on most
aspects of decision making. It is possible that these
problems stem from a more basic problem of viewing
objects as much more desirable than persons without
hoarding tendencies. This would make it harder to
resist the temptation not to take an item, leading to
having many more objects and making it incredibly
difficult to discard objects both because they are so
appealing and because there are a daunting number of
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decisions to be made. Despite its parsimony, this view
does not directly capture the salient and empirically
validated distress in hoarders related to making a
mistake.[27]
Perhaps one could take a functional-neuroanatomic
approach whereby hoarders would have an underlying
problem with their dopaminergic mesolimbocortical
system that produces exacerbated negative feedback
to unexpected punishment (such as having been
caught without an item when one should have had it).
This emotional memory, in turn, generates an unu-
sually positive anticipatory signal when contemplating
acquiring an object of future use, and an inversely
proportional, negative anticipatory signal when con-
templating discarding something that may be useful
later. This view is consistent with the fact that
dysfunction of the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate
cortices (which make up the cortical and limbic
portion of this circuit, respectively) is associated
with impulse control problems, poor insight,
perfectionism, indecisiveness, and anxiety; moreover,
the frontal and the striatal regions of this system
are associated in lesion or functional imaging
studies with hoarding in humans[2–4] and animals [8,9].
Further research on hoarding is needed to specifically
link different aspects of the decision process to
their respective regions within this system. With
this valid experimental task, we can systematically
investigate the neural substrates associated with
each of the subprocesses of the decision using
tools such as functional imaging, event-related poten-
tials, psychophysiology, and transcranial magnetic
stimulation.
Hoarding can cause great distress to the individuals
involved and their families and creates a public
health threat to the community; at the same time, it
is difficult to treat or reverse.[49,50] Moreover, even
nonclinical consumerism negatively impacts the
environment by increasing pollution, waste, and
financial and health disparities between high- and
low-income groups.[51] More empirical research into
the mechanisms of decisions about resources is needed
to address these problems. This novel task for
experimentally investigating decisions about the acqui-
sition/retention of objects can be particularly effective
toward this end because it can access and be used to
manipulate multiple aspects of the decision process
independently, and thus interrogate the complex
interaction between decisions and emotions in a
tractable and valid way.
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